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SOCIAL JUSTICE AND RATIONING SOCIAL SERVICES
Claudia J. Coulton, Ph.D. Marvin Rosenberg, D.S.W.
Assistant Professor Associate Professor
School of Applied Social Sciences
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, Ohio
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the ethical implications of different mechanisms used
by social agencies to ration scarce social services. Mechanisms such as "queing,"
"creaming," and "triage" are discussed from the perspective of two theories of
social justice; i.e., John S. Mill and John Rawls. The purpose of the paper is to
encourage more explicit examination of the assumptions that underlie the distribu-
tion of social services. It is the authors' contention that the present decision
making process is almost entirely based on intuition, political expedience, and
tradition, and that systematic ethical analysis would give stronger justification
to rationing decisions.
Since social services i are a finite and valuable commodity, they can only be
offered to a limited number of people, and therefore, are denied to others. This
dilemma is common to all health and social service programs, from day care to CT
Scanners, from kidney dialysis machines to counseling services. Granted some
services are in greater supply than others, and some may be oversupplied (e.g.,
information and referral); however, these are the exception rather than the rule.
The supply of most social services is restricted and, therefore, must be rationed
in some manner. Given this necessity, there is value in formulating a rational
framework which explicates alternative ethical principles 2 as a step toward deter-
mining which social services should have priority over others, and which people
should have the greater claim to them.
This article will present two fundamentally different theories of distributive
justice and illustrate how each can be applied in assessing the ethical implications
"'Social Services" as used in this paper refers to personal social services
such as counseling, day care, homemakers, residential treatment as well as broader
social welfare provisions such as public assistance, food stamps, and manpower
services.
2 The terms "ethical" and "moral" are often used as equivalent by philosophers
and pertain to concepts such as "good" and "right" (Frankena, 1963:Chapter 1).
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of several rationing mechanisms commonly used in social agencies. The focus will
be on examining the ways agencies manage excess demand for their services. Allo-
cation of resources among national or community social welfare programs (e.g.,
children, elderly, handicapped) or between social welfare and other public pro-
grams such as defense will not be analyzed in this article.
It is not the authors' intention to provide a formula or single principle
that instructs administrators or practitioners on the "ethically correct" method
for distributing services. Hopefully, however, the explicit application of moral
principles to some present rationing mechanisms will provide an intellectual per-
spective which will enable these decisions to be made more systematically and with
stronger justification. It is recognized that ethical principles, however clearly
stated, are not in themselves sufficiently potent to alter rationing mechanisms
that are rooted in law, custom, administrative rules, intuition, or political
pragmaticism. Nevertheless, it is important that social service professionals
make explicit the moral "principles" that underpin rationing decisions and be able
to intellectually defend them.
Theories of Distributive Justice
The intent of this article is to examine social services rationing using
relevant propositions from the philosophical theories of John Stewart Mill and
John Rawls. Of all the ethical theories relating to justice, these two are par-
ticularly applicable since they deal explicitly with economic, political, and
moral principles that directly apply to social welfare. In contrast, earlier
classical theories were largely concerned with individual conduct or rules which
were right or wrong from the standpoint of religion, natural law, or intuition.
Ethical egoists such as Epicurus, Hobbes, and Nietsche held that an act or rule
of action was right only if the one performing the act "promoted his own greatest
good" (Frankena, 1963:14). Further, the philosophical tradition before Mill was
essentially non-consequentialist. That is, the morality of an act was not judged
according to the impact it made on society. For the Greek philosophers there were
self-evident cardinal virtues, for religious philosophers, such as St. Thomas
Aquinas "theological" and "human" virtues were supernatural in origin, and for
humanists such as Shopenhauer and Kant, human virtues were based on enlightened
self-interest rather than either theology or natural law.
John Stewart Mill's Utilitarianism
John Stewart Mill's groundbreaking writings on political-economy and ethics
represented the first comprehensive theory of justice which systematically applied
moral principles to the well-being of society. Building on the writings of Hume
and Bentham, Mill propounded the proposition that "the test by which every princi-
ple should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of mankind . . .
(Heilbroner, 1961:108).
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Unlike most Socialist and Utopian scholars, whose theories were grounded in
deterministic, historical, and structural assumptions, Mill had supreme faith in
the ability of men to control their fate through reason. He believed law and
constructive use of state power could correct the excessive injustices resulting
from the unbridled capitalism of the Industrial Revolution. Mill is credited by
most historians as contributing the most powerful intellectual underpinnings for
welfare liberalism. His writings gave moral, economic, and political justifica-
tion to redistribution of wealth and governmental involvement in social welfare.
Mill's utilitarian conception of justice holds that action and arrangements
are just to the extent that they produce the greatest good, benefits, or happi-
ness for the greatest number of people. In other words, to achieve justice,
goods or resources should be distributed so as to maximize the total amount of
happiness in a society.
3
The application of this utilitarian principle requires some estimate of the
relative utility or benefit accruing to individuals as a result of receiving
various quantities of goods or resources. Both individual satisfaction and the
total number of people affected must be considered in assessing the overall
happiness that will result from a particular decision. For example, a meal will
create more happiness for a person who has little food than for a person who
already has three meals a day, since the basic value of that meal is greater for
the hungry person. Thus, the total good will be maximized by insuring that people
with little food get additional food, with the proviso that there is minimal hard-
ship for those who already have adequate food. The extension of this principle
is the foundation of social welfare policies in most democratic states. A notable
example is the widespread acceptance of the progressive income tax wherein it is
acceptable for government to do some redistribution of income if the "pain" for
taxpayers is small while the benefits to society are great.
Critics of utilitarianism, including John Rawls, note that there are both
practical and moral problems with the utilitarian conception. The practical prob-
lem is the fact that simply aggregating the numbers of people who benefit from
the distribution of a resource does not in itself make the distribution just. It
is difficult to compare the benefit accruing to 100 people with no income who each
receive $500 per month with 10,000 people who receive $5 per month. Simply stated,
"the greatest good for the greatest number" principle lacks an operational method
for determining the relative benefits that resources bring to different groups of
people.
There are also moral problems within the utilitarian view. It has been
argued that by defining justice as that which produces the greatest good for the
3Happiness as used by Mill goes beyond basic satisfactions such as subsistence
and sex to include higher pleasures related to intellectual, aesthetic, and human-
itarian pursuits.
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greatest number, society could tolerate the exploitation or suffering of a small
minority. The most obvious current illustration is the seeming necessity to have
a high unemployment rate in order to curb inflation. While this policy purportedly
benefits most people, it is at the expense of the minority who are unemployed
(Mill, 1971).
John Rawls' Theory of Justice
The first full scale critical attack on utilitarianism was a widely acclaimed
mammoth philosophical treatise by John Rawls in 1971. Rawls' objections to utili-
tarianism cover a wide variety of points, too numerous to note in this brief arti-
cle. For example, questions are raised about the clarity of the notion of utility,
about the plausibility of a principle that requires quantification of happiness,
and about how the interests of one group of people can be weighed against each
other and against those of future generations.
Rawls' strongest attack is that utilitarianism is untenable because it could
theoretically permit a maximum amount of happiness to be produced for a maximum
number of people through the abuse, indeed the enslavement, of a minority. While
the utilitarians have offered counter arguments to make such injustices untenable,
this correction has not fully satisfied many critics.
A Theory of Justice is not merely one more critical attack on utilitarianism.
As Charles Frankel noted, "Rawls' . . . purpose . . . is nothing less than to over-
turn two centuries of empirical, utilitarian, and positivistic philosophies and to
produce a work in moral thought that goes back to Natural Law and social contract
theory . . . (Frankel, 1975:55). Rawls challenged advocates of utilitarianism and
liberalism to show the superiority of their views against this new conception of
justice. This article will make no attempt to summarize the wide-ranging issues
that Rawls covers, but simply highlight the basic assumptions that relate to dis-
tributive justice and give the reader some notion of how Rawls derives his major
propositions from them.
The Rawlsian position simply put, is that, whenever there are inequalities in
society, the only justification for their existence is that they are to the long-
term benefit of the least favored members of society. The more commonly held
liberal view that those who are advantaged owe it to those who are disadvantaged to
share some of those advantages is insufficient for Rawls. His view is not a simple
egalitarian one. It is far more complex, and he arrives at it through a conjec-
tural account in which a group of people negotiate the rules that would govern the
society in which they live.
The Rawlsian account begins with a number of assumptions about human nature
that he invites the reader to accept as reasonable. Namely, each person is a
rational egoist who is pursuing some set of goals and the pursuit of these goals
requires social interaction with others. He then creates a hypothetical situation
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in which he asks us to contemplate a group of people freely coming together to
negotiate the principles of justice by which they would bind themselves to live
as a community. Further, the negotiators in the hypothetical account are intelli-
gent, rational agents, each of whom is well-informed about human psychology,
economics, sociology, etc., and each acts in terms of his own self-interest and
is completely uninterested in the welfare of his fellow negotiators. That is, he
seeks neither to block or advance others' pursuit of their goals. He is free of
emotions of sympathy or envy, but is entirely focused on his own objectives.
In this hypothetical situation, each of the negotiators is assumed to be very
knowledgeable in general, but without particular knowledge about themselves or
others. They could be any age, race, sex, income or ability level. They are
unable to distinguish themselves from anyone else. This state in which every
agent is generally knowledgeable but knows literally nothing about his own or
others' personal characteristics, Rawls labels "the veil of ignorance."
The veil eliminates the possibility that anyone is negotiating to protect
special interests at the expense of someone else's interests. No bias is possible
since none of the negotiators know what position would help or hurt them once the
veil is lifted. Rawls calls the situation in which the negotiators find them-
selves the "original position." Under such conditions, he argues, they have no
choice but to adopt principles which allow the maximum opportunity to everyone in
the event that when the veil is lifted they are in the least advantaged position.
From this conjectural account, Rawls derives two principles of justice. The
first, the liberty principle, specifies that "each person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with
a similar system of liberty for all." The second, the difference principle, deals
with scarce material goods and social advantages. Although the negotiators could
opt for an equal distribution of goods and other values, they would soon realize
that they stand to benefit by the introduction of certain inequalities in the dis-
tribution of advantages. An example Rawls uses is of giving a rural physician an
airplane. While this would make him relatively advantaged, the rural population,
and especially the least advantaged among them, would generally benefit from this
inequality. But other advantages, such as tax loopholes which do not help the
disadvantaged, would be prohibited. Rawls labels this line of reasoning "Justice
as Fairness."
Rawls' theory has been the subject of great debate and controversy within
philosophical and social science circles (Gorovitz, 1975). The principle suppor-
ters are the "new egalitarians" who reject the traditional liberal conceptions of
equality of opportunity in favor of equality of result. Rawls and his supporters
claim a moral superiority of the theory to the traditional utilitarian view in
that the least advantaged persons in the society are the priority beneficiaries
in this conception of justice.
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Critics of Rawls such as Charles Frankel, Daniel Bell, and Robert Nisbet
believe his form of redemptive and compensatory justice would eventually lead to
the progressive pauperization of society. But substituting disadvantage for merit
as a major criterion for reward, it is argued that those with the least to contri-
bute will gain inordinately while those with superior talent will lose incentive.
Issues in the Application of Theories
Rawls' and Mill's theories are complex and cannot be used simply or mechani-
cally. In fact, applying these theories to the rationing problem requires sensi-
tivity to several serious perplexities. Their recognition is helpful in pointing
to some limitations of making the theories operational.
Difficulty in measuring results. The application of a moral theory usually
requires knowledge of certain empirical facts that are often difficult to ascer-
tain. For example, the application of the utilitarian principle of maximizing
total happiness requires some quantification of the benefit that would accrue
from alternative patterns of distribution. Similarly, application of Rawls'
principles requires a measurement of the degree of need or relative disadvantage
experienced by various groups. Sometimes decision makers have data that can
illuminate these questions. Often? however, there are large gaps in the informa-
tion available requiring estimates that may or may not be valid. The ethical
reasoning may be systematically applied, but, if the data are unavailable or
erroneous, the actual policy adopted may have unjust results.
Who defines "happiness" or "disadvantage"? "Happiness" and "disadvantage"
are value-laden concepts that are open to diverse interpretations. Societal
judgements may differ from consumer judgements. For example, society may hold
that being economically productive is an indicator of, or contributor to, personal
happiness, but it is possible that some individuals may disagree with this point.
Similarly, some people may believe that being old is indicative of severe disad-
vantage; others do not view the aging process in this light. Since the applica-
tion of Mill's and Rawls' theories depends so heavily on such value judgements,
the origins of the definitions should be made explicit before the theories are
applied.
Difficulty in predicting consequences. From the perspective of Mill and Rawls,
the justness of a decision or policy depends on its consequences. However, fore-
casting the consequences of a rationing mechanism is often based on little more
than informed speculation. Under these circumstances, the impact of the mechanism
would have to be reexamined periodically. Especially after a method is introduced,
data could be collected on what types of people were receiving services and what
types of people were being turned away. If the consequences appeared unjust, at
that point the allocation system could be modified.
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Temporal and geographic boundaries. A rationing mechanism may not only
affect an agency's present clients, but also future generations and people in
other locations. However, to facilitate the application of theories of distribu-
tive justice, there must be some limit on whose well-being is to be considered.
At times, it will be reasonable to focus on the consequences of rationing for an
agency's clientele or geographic service area. At other times, the type or scope
of service will suggest including the impact of rationing on future generations
or larger geographic areas in the analysis. For example, a utilitarian principle
might support giving priority to community-based care of the mentally ill rather
than to institutional care if only the happiness of clients were the prime consid-
eration. However, if the level of discontent among community residents was also
considered, using a larger portion of resources for institutional care might seem
justified.
Danger of revealing moral dilemmas. If both moral theories discussed above
were applied to a rationing mechanism, they would often lead to different judge-
ments of the justness of the mechanism (Lorish, 1976). This could be disconcert-
ing if it revealed moral dilemmas. Although perplexing, such dilemmas have the
advantage of alerting decision makers to the potentially conflicting ethical
implications of a rationing plan.
Applying Theories to Rationing
With the preceding cautions in mind, current rationing mechanisms can now be
examined from the point of view of the two theories of distributive justice. Many
forms of rationing are used by social agencies. These mechanisms may be implicit
or explicit, rational or non-rational. Sometimes, they are established without
formal discussion or explicit policy, but are the results of disparate decisions
that become the "conventional wisdom" of the agency. Other mechanisms appear to
reflect an implicit attempt to apply an ethical principle. They all serve the
function of keeping service distribution orderly and insuring that demand is con-
tained.
What follows is an analysis of some typical rationing mechanisms found in
social welfare organizations. These are simplified for purposes of illustration.
It is rare that an agency would use a single approach for all services. This
analysis is not intended to be comprehensive but to demonstrate how rationing
mechanisms can be analyzed from the perspectives of two theories of distributive
justice.
Queing. A common-sense approach that is widely used when the quantity of a
service or resource is limited is to allocate available supplies in the order in
which people apply for them. For example, a hunger center may distribute food
packages until the supplies are depleted. People who make requests at the end of
the month must be turned away because the center will not be resupplied until the
first of the following month.
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The use of a waiting list is a slight variation on this "first come, first
served" theme. If the lists are long, many will have withdrawn their requests by
the time their name reaches the top. Waiting lists of potential adoptive parents
could be an example of this form of rationing.
This approach is probably based on the assumption that it is fair to distri-
bute limited resources according to the order in which people request them. To
do otherwise would be to deprive people of what is rightfully theirs, that is,
their place in line. If a person is efficient, arrives early, and uses his energy
to make a timely demand, it seems unfair to deprive him of the rewards for these
efforts. This mechanism is widely used because it is also convenient from an
administrative standpoint.
When services are rationed in this way, it is often the most assertive and
knowledgeable individuals who receive them. The least capable or most impaired
people may have the greatest difficulty in reaching the front of a que. When this
is the case, a first-come-first-served approach to rationing would fail to benefit
the least advantaged as Rawls' principle requires.
From a utilitarian perspective, the question arises as to whether a first-
come-first-served policy would maximize total happiness. If all people request-
ing services would benefit equally from receiving them, the the first-come-first-
served approach would probably yield as much total happiness as any other approach
and has the advantage of being easy to apply. However, this is frequently not
the case. A unit of service often has greater utility to a person who has not
had previous service. For example, given people with similar capacity to use the
service, an hour of counseling at the point of initial request might have a higher
utility than would an additional hour after six months of psychotherapy. However,
if counseling were rationed on a first-come-first-served basis, the new applicant
would be placed on the waiting list and the counselor's time would go to the
client already in therapy who may not need the service as much as someone who
just recently applied. Such an arrangement would reduce the overall well-being
for the total society.
Hidden and hard to get benefits. When programs are complex causing public
information about entitlement to be obscure and eligibility determination to be
complicated, the resulting red tape may serve to ration services. Regardless of
whether these bureaucratic measures are intended or not, many public agencies
would have insufficient supplies if all who were legally entitled to benefits
knew of their existence and demanded them. When the intake and eligibility pro-
cess is long and tedious, some consumers doubtless avoid requesting services.
When eligibility criteria are unclear, many people are not aware of their own
eligibility. Such factors serve to limit demand and often penalize the most
needy but least knowledgeable clients.
For example, it has been documented that many elderly people who are quali-
fied to receive food stamps do not take advantage of tham (G.A.O., 1977). In some
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cases, they are not aware of their eligibility; in other cases, they may be avoid-
ing red tape. Others feel stigmatized and therefore shun this type of assistance.
However, for those who do apply, lack of clarity about eligibility, contradictory
interpretations of regulations, and cumbersome procedures often result in a limi-
tation on the granting of benefits.
In applying principles of justice to this approach, it would seem that many
of the preceding comments related to the "queing mechanism" apply. Since success-
ful pursuit of obscure or hidden benefits requires knowledge, persistence, aggres-
sion, and ingenuity, Rawls' directive to benefit the least advantaged will seldom
be met.
From a utilitarian perspective, hidden or hard to get benefits are clearly
unjust since the basic purpose of such social welfare legislation is to transfer
resources from those who can afford to pay taxes to those in need, thus benefit-
ing the entire society. Indeed, it would be consistent with utilitarianism for
the government to make every effort to ensure the awarding of such legal entitle-
ments to those who have a right to them. This would benefit the greatest number
and presumably he good for the total society.
"Creaming." A method of rationing that has particular appeal to agencies
fearing federal cuts or seeking higher appropriations is sometimes known as
"creaming." Simply stated, this involves selecting those candidates for a program
or service who have a high potential to achieve success while needing relatively
few of the agency's resources. The agency is able to show high success rates, few
program drop-outs, and excellent cost-containment. A notable example is manpower
training programs where some agencies explicitly select candidates who have rela-
tively successful work histories (Rosenberg, 1969).
Another example might be a settlement house that chooses to offer recrea-
tional and social programs to youth who are reasonably well-adjusted. This
rationing decision excludes serving more alienated and hostile youth who require
more intensive and comprehensive services, often over a long period of time.
Services to these more difficult cases would be very costly and sometimes might
fail because of other environmental, intrapsychic, and interpersonal difficulties.
In comparison, "creaming" would show "good statistics," with few failures and low
costs.
"Creaming" as a method of rationing has seemingly little ethical justifica-
tion using a Rawlsian view of justice. This method explicitly avoids serving
the most disadvantaged people since this would almost certainly drive unit costs
very high. The short-term consequences may initially appear to be consistent
with utilitarian justice in that large numbers can be served with modest outlays
of public and voluntary expenditures. However, the actual amount of benefits pro-
duced may be modest since the recipients, who were presumably fairly well off at
the outset, might have been successful without the services.
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Nevertheless, the essential question that must be examined is the long-range
consequences of "creaming." If people who need only a small amount of help to
become fully functioning are served and then are set on a course that prevents
their becoming high risk candidates for more intensive costly services, this
would further the utilitarian argument. However, the exclusion of the most dis-
advantaged youth makes it most unjust from a Rawlsian view. It is such an issue
that illuminates the distinction between the two views of justice.
Equal rationing. When a resource is limited, it may be divided equally among
all who request it. For example, since the funds available for emergency assis-
tance to public welfare families are never sufficient to meet the potential demand,
a department may allow every eligible family to have emergency assistance only
once a year. If most families request this assistance each year, the effect is
an equal distribution of these emergency funds. This approach to rationing may
be based on a belief that fairness dictates that all share alike even if the
shares are small.
At first glance, dividing a limited pool of resources equally seems to be an
equitable and just approach. Everyone gets something, while no one does completely
without, and no one gets more than anyone else. From a utilitarian perspective,
it could be argued that this approach benefits the largest absolute number of
people. However, it is possible that dividing the pool of resources equally
yields services that are too small to be of use to anyone. For example, if 1,000
meals per week are available at a senior citizens' center, giving one meal a week
to 1,000 people is less likely to have a positive impact than giving two or three
meals to a smaller number of people. Thus, if portions are too small to benefit
anyone or if people with minimal needs are served, the utilitarian criteria for
justice would not be met.
Rawls' view of justice would support this equal distribution of services to
all only if everyone were equally advantaged at the time. If that were not the
case, Rawls' principles would call for an allocation pattern that would give
larger shares to the least advantaged and, perhaps, nothing to those who were
relatively better off. Thus, equal distribution is not synonymous with equitable
distribution from either a utilitarian or Rawlsian perspective.
Societal protection. If everyone cannot be served, priority may be given to
those who exert great pressure or who are most likely to do harm to others. For
example, potentially aggressive and disruptive people may be given the first
available bed in a psychiatric hospital. Special programs are made available in
neighborhoods where there is a potential for a "riot." Summer jobs are given to
youth who are assumed to be the most potentially disruptive.
This approach may be based on the view that directing services to those who
need to be controlled protects the larger community. Although dangerous people
constitute a small minority, they arouse fear among the general public. Services
designed to manage their potential threat may, therefore, be seen as beneficial
to almost everyone.
Protecting society from potentially violent people or "troublesome groups"
seems very much at odds with Rawlsian concepts of justice and very consistent with
utilitarian principles. While the disadvantaged beneficiaries of services may
benefit in the short run, these programs are often transient and are maintained
only as long as the threat to the majority looms high. When services that are
designed purely as social control mechanisms--such as summer youth jobs and drug
maintenance programs--fail to come to grips with the essential nature of the
problem, they are only cosmetic in nature.
Dangerous people are usually in a small minority, but controlling them could
benefit the entire society in whom they engender fear. Thus, services directed
toward this group would seem to make a large contribution to the total happiness
and, therefore, be just from the utilitarian perspective. However, if the efforts
are only transient, they would not be consistent with utilitarianism, since the
positive consequences would be short-lived.
The preferred recipients. The distribution of resources may be guided by
beliefs about who is deserving or should be given preference. There are various
criteria that have been used for judging preferential treatment, some of them
ethical, some political, and others which are essentially a matter of taste.4
Veterans may be given priority on the basis of their past contributions to society.
Minorities may be given special access to resources because they have suffered
past discrimination. The waiting list for marital counseling may be waived for a
prominent member of the community.
This mechanism is applied more subtly in situations where clients' physical
or intellectual "attractiveness" affects decisions regarding who should be given
service. Consider, for example, the differential assignment of staff to a couple
with an "interesting" marital problem versus a disoriented elderly individual.
This judgement of an applicant's worth may be made at many levels, from agency
receptionist to service provider. Even among active program participants, more
attention may be given to "attractive" members than to those who are "unattrac-
tive. ,,5
Whether it is ever just to allocate resources to a preferred group depends
upon the basis for the preference. If the group has priority simply because they
are more appealing or have higher social status, this would be morally arbitrary
and, therefore, distribution on this basis could not be considered just.
4 Although merit alone is not considered a just basis for unequal distribution
of resources by either of the theories discussed here, it was considered just by
earlier philosophers. See, for example, Ross (1925).
5See, for example, Bruce and Milcarek (1980:272-290); Roth (1972:839-856).
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Under other circumstances, however, preference for a designated group might
be consistent with the tenets of Rawls' theory of justice. For example, in the
case of a minority group, it might be demonstrated that the preferred group con-
tained many disadvantaged members due to past oppression and discrimination. If
this were true, giving preference to minorities would be justifiable according to
Rawls. Similarly, scarce resources might be reserved for a relatively privileged
group because their work was expected to ultimately benefit the most disadvan-
taged. From a utilitarian perspective, preference for a particular group would
be justified if this resulted in the maximum happiness for the larger community.
For example, if giving preference to a prominent citizen resulted in a major
donation, more people could be served, thereby producing greater societal bene-
fits.
Membership rationing. General demands on services may be handled by restric-
ting them to those in a particular status. Sectarian or denominational services
are primarily given to the members of specific religious groups. Self-help
groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous, Welfare Rights, Parents Anonymous, and "Safe
Space" reserve their help for people who have similar problems.
This selective approach to service delivery is consistent with the histori-
cal emphasis on pluralism and volunteerism in the United States. It also reflects
a commitment to the idea of social responsibility. Such individual and group
initiatives have led to innumerable agencies and organizations who have designated
well-defined groups as the primary beneficiaries of their services, thus exclu-
sively targeting their resources to their own constituencies.
According to the previous views of justice, the practice of "restricting
services to a designated group" may have two effects. If the group served is
targeted because of a particular disadvantage (i.e., frail elderly, severely
handicapped, or retarded), then special efforts on its behalf would be entirely
consistent with Rawlsian justice. It is to this very high risk population that
Rawls' principles would direct the benefits of society.
The problem, however, with this rationing mechanism is that many agencies
limit their services to those disadvantaged people who also have other group
characteristics which make them eligible. For example, religious status, income,
past military service, or even age may determine whether they will be regarded as
eligible clients of the agency. As an illustration, imagine two families with
similar social class backgrounds, levels of education, and income. Each has a
child with a different physical disability. One child has cerebral palsy and in
most communities could go to the cerebral palsy agency and receive a full array
of services and resources, including counseling, transporation, appliances, and
physical therapy. A similar child with spina bifida might receive some financial
help from the state, but there are few communities with agencies to provide the
range of life-supporting services available to the child with cerebral palsy. If
the target population is severely disadvantaged, there are elements of Rawlsian
justice involved; but the fact that so many other disadvantaged people are rejected
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simply because they dod not have the "right" problems often makes this approach
inconsistent with any ethical principle of rationing.
Market rationing. Human services that are delivered on a strict fee-for-
service basis are rationed purely according to one's ability to pay. In the
proprietary sector, increased supply may result when entrepreneurs see the service
as a good investment. Of course, demand is always constrained by the fact that
only those who can pay or have a third party payer can receive service. Private
home health care agencies are an example of organizations that function in this
manner. The high cost of care excludes many people from using it.
Certainly, the most powerful argument against this rationing method would
seem to come from Rawls, since this method entirely excludes those needy people
who are disadvantaged and also cannot afford to pay for the service. However,
Rawlsian logic is not quite so simple. A case could theoretically be made for the
fact that proprietary agencies indirectly benefit the most disadvantaged, since
such agencies pay taxes which are used to support public services to the poor.
There is, however, little empirical evidence to support this proposition.
Market rationing would not be consistent with utilitarianism for a variety
of reasons. There is a high correlation between those who are poor and other
disadvantages such as their physical and mental disability or past discrimination.
If there were inadequate public provision for these populations because of empha-
sis on proprietary services, many people needing services would not receive them.
The greatest numbers with the greatest needs would be neglected, and the general
well-being of all society would be adversely affected. However, for utilitarians,
an additional issue would be the question of how much liberty the majority had to
sacrifice in order to help those who were poor or disadvantaged in other ways.
While Mill is credited with being the father of modern welfare economics, it must
be remembered that he strongly objected to any excess in either paternalism or
his taxes. In general, private initiative and freedom of choice were preferred.
Redistribution was desirable only to the point that it did not engender undue
hardships or restrict the liberties of those with means.
Triage.6 This term was applied by the French Medical Corps to the rationing
of medical services on the battlefield during World War I. In this process, cas-
ualties with the highest potential for returning to combat were treated first.
Those who could recover without immediate care and those who were likely to die
or deteriorate were treated last or not at all.
The principle of "triage" can also be considered as another mechanism for
rationing scarce social services, wherein the persons given highest preference
6The term "triage" is derived from the French medical treatment of battle
casualties in World War I, where casualties were not treated if their chances
of recovery without medical help were good or if they were likely to die even if
treatment were given.
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are those with the greatest potential for continued productivity. Those with the
least potential for being productive or independent would have the lowest priority
for services.
Examples of triage in rationing social services might include the voacational
rehabilitation agencies that provide services first to persons who are potentially
employable, but suffer from some impairment that interferes with their getting a
job on their own. Similarly, counseling agencies may give preference to those who
are most amenable to insight-type psychotherapy and reject those who seem poor
candidates for this type of treatment or who are likely to improve without inter-
vention. Limited day care resources may be reserved for mothers who are seeking
employment and may, therefore, become independent, often excluding those who want
day care for other reasons or who have limited employment potential.
The application of this rationing mechanism usually contributes to a favor-
able cost-effectiveness ratio for the people served and to a positive evaluation
of the agency. Triage should be distinguished from "creaming," where the selec-
tion bias is toward those who really require little or no service. Triage, on the
other hand, includes the selection of the severely impaired if they can make good
use of the service in terms of being productive or independent.
Rationing via triage is probably most congruent with a utilitarian view of
justice. The assumption here is that the total happiness will be maximized if
services are reserved for those who are most likely to be contributive and less
dependent. For example, the Older Americans Act provides for nutrition programs
for the elderly. This includes congregate meals in churches and community centers,
as well as home-delivered meals for those who are frail and impaired. A triage
approach might dictate that most of these funds be apportioned to the healthier
and active elderly who are still most active and useful, rather than to the frail
and impaired elderly who are home-bound and dependent. By serving the ambulatory
elderly, the same limited funds could be distributed over a larger population,
resulting in both improved nutrition and reduced social isolation. Assuming that
these elderly persons would have been relatively isolated and undernourished with-
out the congregate meals program, this distribution would probably produce the
greatest amount of good for the largest number of elderly recipients and for
society as a whole.
From a Rawlsian view, however, failure to serve the severely impaired and
isolated home-bound group would be an unethical choice, since it would fail to
reach those who were worse off. Thus, in this example, the triage approach seems
largely utilitarian because it opts to serve large numbers of persons who have
the capacity to function with relative independence. A Rawlsian preferential
treatment approach would call for a reverse order of distribution, with the worse
off being cared for first.
Needs assessment. Scarce resources may be distributed according to a formal
assessment of who has the greatest need for them. For example, homemaker services
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are frequently provided first to those who are most severely impaired. Children
who are clearly abused or neglected are given priority for foster home placement.
Some residential treatment facilities often give preference to the most severely
disturbed and those at risk of being harmed. The children scoring very poorly
on developmental tests may be assigned the limited slots in a head start program.
Needs assessment as a rationing mechanism seems most consistent with Rawls'
principles of distributive justice. Those in greatest need of social services
are usually the most disadvantaged consumers, and, therefore, Rawls would call for
providing disproportionate amounts of resources to this group. For example, if a
hospital reserved a sizeable share of its scarce social work resources for the
terminally ill and because they were seen as having the most profound distress,
this would be consistent with Rawlsian justice. Conversely, using utilitarian
logic, this selective use of resources despite the inordinate degree of suffering
would probably not be considered just. Given the costly nature of their problems
and the small chance of recovery or remission, each terminally ill person might
require a large investment of time while achieving a rather small amount of
improvement. Thus, serving this group would detract resources from the larger
majority of patients who also needed help.
Conclusion
The preceding application of two theories of distributive justice to mechan-
isms for rationing scarce social service resources has many implications. First,
some of the simplest and most commonly used forms of rationing such as queing or
equal distribution may be most undesirable from the standpoint of justice.
Laissez-faire approaches that rely on the market, or aggressively seeking obscure
benefits may have similar unjust results. Although the agency's intent simply
may be to handle excess demand smoothly, the potential benefits of a service to
society may be greatly diminished. In addition, clients with the most severe
impairments may be most unlikely to receive the services they need. Thus, from
both Rawls' and Mill's views of justice, these mechanisms are morally deficient.
Second, approaches to rationing that may be politically popular (i.e., "creaming"
or "societal protection") may result in low costs but are likely to have few
benefits. This is most apparent when the persons served could function adequately
without help or when programs are short-lived. Such rationing is not just from
the perspective of either Mill's or Rawls' theories.
Third, some rationing based on preference or group membership may be just
under some circumstances but not others. An analysis of the relative disadvan-
tage of the designated group is required to assess these types of mechanisms
according to Rawls' principles. Examination of the consequences to society of
giving priority to special groups would be necessary to apply a utilitarian stan-
dard.
Finally, the two forms of rationing that may be most difficult to implement,
needs assessment and triage, are most consistent with the theories of justice
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presented here. Approaches to rationing based on an assessment of need are most
likely to be justifiable according to Rawlsian principles. Utilitarian arguments
are strongly supportive of rationing mechanisms based on cost-benefit considera-
tions.
Some readers may question whether the type of analytic process illustrated in
this article yields any better decisions than intuition or practice wisdom. The
authors recognize that philosophical theories are written in highly abstract lang-
uage and are difficult to apply. Further, these theories do not offer specific
prescriptions for what rationing decisions are "right" or "wrong." Sometimes, the
conclusions about what constitutes justice may be at odds with one's own ethical
predispositions, resulting in the exposure of a moral dilemma rather than a single
mandate for action.
Nevertheless, in a profession whose foundation is ethical, compassionate, and
intellectual, such moral analysis seems essential. Over the years, social work
has given attention to values, the ethical conduct of workers, and varying ideolo-
gies that relate to social reform, but there has been little systematic attention
to questions of distributive justice. Everyday rationing decisions are being made
in social agencies without serious consideration of why one or another principle
should be invoked. When challenged, these allocation procedures are often diffi-
cult to defend.
Theories of distributive justice such as the two presented here can be intel-
lectually and morally defended, and therefore can contribute to an activist
approach. They seem potentially useful to the profession as it seeks to develop
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